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Abstract
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a logical framework in which one can describe in great detail how actions
are perceived by the agents, and how they affect the world. DEL games were recently introduced as a way to
define classes of games with imperfect information where the actions available to the players are described very
precisely. This framework makes it possible to define easily, for instance, classes of games where players can
only use public actions or public announcements. These games have been studied for reachability objectives,
where the aim is to reach a situation satisfying some epistemic property expressed in epistemic logic; several
(un)decidability results have been established.
In this work we show that the decidability results obtained for reachability objectives extend to a much more
general class of winning conditions, namely those expressible in the epistemic temporal logic LTLK. To do so
we establish that the infinite game structures generated by DEL public actions are regular, and we describe how
to obtain finite representations on which we rely to solve them.
1 Introduction
Strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems refers to a number of important issues for settings where
a team of agents have to take decisions in order to achieve some goals, while evolving in an environ-
ment that may pursue different objectives. Application domains are numerous (economics, robotics,
distributed computing systems, web services, etc). For instance, drones patrolling an area may have
to decide which trajectory to take so that the status (safe or unsafe) of each zone in this area is always
known to at least one of them, while antagonistic agents try to keep the status of some areas secret.
It is a real challenge to automatically compute adequate individual strategies for the agents. In this
work we consider the distributed strategy synthesis problem, in which a team of agents collaborates
towards a common goal, while the environment is purely antagonistic.
Because agents typically have a local view of the system, such situations are usually modelled as
Type of DEL game presentation Logic Complexity
propositional actions and hierarchical information LTLK decidable (Th. 15)
public actions LTLK 2EXPTIME-complete (Th. 19)
public announcements LTL(U)K0 PSPACE-complete (Th. 21)
Table 1 Summary of our contribution.
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imperfect information game arenas, i.e., graphs whose nodes represent positions of the game, edges
are the possible actions, and equivalence relations capture indistinguishability of positions. To reflect
imperfect information, strategies must prescribe the same action in indistinguishable situations; such
strategies are classically called uniform or observation-based strategies [36, 20, 7, 29]. Also the goal,
or winning condition, is often expressed in some logical language such as LTL [33, 32] or LTLK, its
extension with knowledge operators [39, 40]. For the patrolling example, one could consider the
LTLK formula G
∧
zone
∨
agent(Kagent safezone ∨ Kagent¬safezone) which says that always, for every
zone, some agent knows whether it is safe or not.
Distributed strategy synthesis is known to be undecidable [28, 32], but the numerous literature
on the topic has identified two main decidable cases: the case where actions in the games are public
(known to all agents) [39, 40, 35, 5, 4, 13], and the case of hierarchical information (the set of agents
can be totally ordered so that what is known propagates along this order) [22, 32, 19, 27, 18, 30, 37,
8].
However, the state explosion problem makes game structures often very large, making distrib-
uted synthesis intractable. In order to circumvent this difficulty, we promote a planning approach
using Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [41]: instead of representing explicitly the game structure,
we consider implicit descriptions by means of DEL presentations. These consist in a finite initial
epistemic model that reflects the initial knowledge of the agents, and a finite set of epistemic actions
available to them and the other agents in the environment. Such implicit descriptions make it easier
for the modeller to add, modify or remove actions. Also, since DEL action models were introduced
to represent in detail how events are observed by agents, this setting is very convenient to define vari-
ous types of actions such as public actions or semi-private announcements, and study how restricting
to such actions can make distributed synthesis easier.
While DEL presentations have been widely used in epistemic planning (finding a finite succes-
sion of events that achieves some epistemic property) [12], only recently have adversarial aspects
been considered in this setting, along with strategic problems such as distributed strategy synthesis.
In [26], agents are split into two antagonistic teams Agt∃ and Agt∀, and agents in Agt∃ pursue
some goal while agents in Agt∀ try to prevent them from winning (these are zero-sum games). For
reachability objectives where the team Agt∃ wants to reach a situation that satisfies some epistemic
property, it is shown in [26] that, as in the setting of explicit game arenas, distributed strategy syn-
thesis is undecidable, but decidability can be recovered for the case of public actions and hierarchical
information.
In this work we lift these decidability results from reachability goals to the much larger family of
winning conditions expressible in the temporal epistemic logic LTLK, that blends temporal operators
and epistemic modalities. This logic can express the reachability objectives from [26] (they corres-
pond to formulas of the form Fϕ, where F is the “Finally” temporal operator and ϕ is an epistemic
formula), but also safety, liveness properties, and many more (see for instance [40] for a detailed
security example).
In all our decidability results, a crucial step is to show that the game arena induced by a DEL
game presentation, which is in general infinite, can be represented finitely. This was already known
for the case of actions whose preconditions do not involve knowledge but are purely propositional
formulas (so-called propositional actions) [24, 16], and we use it to transfer an existing result for
distributed synthesis in explicit game arenas with hierarchical information. The main technical con-
tribution of this work is to prove that the infinite game generated from a DEL game presentation is
regular also in the case of public actions. This is done by observing that, modulo isomorphism, such
actions can only generate finitely many different epistemic models from the initial one, thus allowing
us to get an equivalent finite game as the quotient of the infinite one. This, combined with a recent
result on game arenas with public actions [6], yields a procedure that runs in doubly exponential
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time, just as the case of LTL games [33]. Additionally, for public announcements (a special case
of public actions) and the syntactic fragment of LTLK without next operator and local knowledge
properties only, we show an even stronger characteristic of game arenas that allows us to reduce to a
polynomial-length horizon game and to derive an optimal PSPACE procedure.
Related work. The only work on DEL games that we are aware of is [26], and it only considers
reachability objectives. However our results relate to the many aforementioned results for distributed
synthesis in explicit game structures with either public actions or hierarchical information. Those
dealing with epistemic temporal logic are the closest to ours and can be found in [34, 25] for hier-
archical information, and [39, 40, 6, 4] for public actions.
Plan. Section 2 recalls games with imperfect information and the logic LTLK. Section 3 recalls DEL
game presentations as defined in [26]. The central sections 4, 5, 6 describe our contributions for the
cases of propositional actions, public actions and public announcements, respectively. We discuss
our results in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall basics about games with imperfect information and the epistemic temporal
logic LTLK.
2.1 Games with imperfect information
We consider multiplayer game arenas with imperfect information in the spirit of, e.g., [38, 21, 9].
Since the DEL games we define in the next section are turn-based, i.e., the agents play in turns and
not concurrently, we define turn-based arenas instead of the more general concurrent ones usually
considered in the aforementioned works.
For the rest of the paper let us fix a countable set of atomic propositions AP and a finite set of
agents Agt that is partitioned into two antagonistic teams, Agt∃ and Agt∀.
◮ Definition 1. A game arenaG = (V, VI , Act, δ, t, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) is a tuple where:
V is a non-empty set of positions,
VI ⊆ V is the set of initial positions,
Act is a non-empty set of actions,
δ : V ×Act ⇀ V is a partial transition function,
t : V → Agt is a turn function,
≈a⊆ V × V is an indistinguishability relation for agent a, and
λ : V → 2AP is a labelling or valuation function.
In a position v, agent t(v) chooses an action α such that v′ = δ(v, α) is defined, and the game
proceeds similarly from position v′. We let Act(v) = {α | (v, α) ∈ dom(δ)}, where dom denotes
the domain, and we assume that Act(v) 6= ∅ for every position v.
A play π = v0v1v2 . . . in G is an infinite sequence of positions such that for all i ∈ N, there
exists α ∈ Act such that vi+1 = δ(vi, α). We let πi = vi and π≤i = v0v1 . . . vi. We also let
PlaysG denote the set of plays in G. A history h = v0v1 . . . vn is a finite nonempty prefix of a play,
last(h) = vn is the last position in h and Hist
G is the set of histories in G. We may write t(h),
Act(h) and λ(h) for, respectively, t(last(h)), Act(last(h)) and λ(last(h)).
The indistinguishability relation ≈a is an equivalence relation between positions of the game
arena that represents how agent a observes them: v ≈a v′ means that agent a cannot distinguish
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between positions v and v′. As a result, we assume that if v ≈a v′ for some agent a, then t(v) =
t(v′), which means that agents know whose turn it is to play. In addition, if t(v) = a and v ≈a v′,
we assume that Act(v) = Act(v′), meaning that the agent who has to make a move knows which
actions are available.
We consider agents that have synchronous perfect recall, i.e. they remember the whole sequence
of observations they made, and know how many moves have been made. To model this, each indis-
tinguishability relation≈a is lifted to histories as follows: h ≈a h′ if |h| = |h′| and for every i < |h|
it holds that hi ≈a h′i.
A strategy for agent a is a partial function σ : HistG ⇀ Act such that for every h with t(h) = a,
it holds that σ(h) ∈ Act(h). Because agents can only base their decisions on what they observe,
their strategies must assign the same action to indistinguishable situations: a strategy σ for agent a is
uniform if, for all histories h, h′ such that t(h) = t(h′) = a and h ≈a h′, it holds that σ(h) = σ(h′).
We say that a play π follows a strategy σ for agent a if for every i ∈ N such that t(π≤i) = a, it
holds that πi+1 = δ(πi, σ(π≤i)). A distributed strategy for a group of agents A ⊆ Agt is a tuple
σA = (σa)a∈A, and we write Out(σA) the set of outcomes of σA, i.e. the set of plays that start in
VI and follow each σa for a ∈ A.
A game G = (G,Win) is a game arena G with a winning conditionWin ⊆ PlaysG. Team Agt∃
wins a game G if there is a distributed strategy σAgt∃ such that every play in Out(σAgt∃) is in Win.
◮ Definition 2. LetG = (V, VI , Act, δ, t, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) be a game arena. We define the unfolding
of G as the game arena Gunf = (V ′, V ′I , Act, δ
′, t′, (≈′a)a∈Agt, λ
′) where V ′ = HistG, V ′I = VI , for
every h ∈ HistG, t′(h) = t(last(h)) and λ′(h) = λ(last(h)), ≈′a is the synchronous perfect-recall
lifting of ≈a to histories, and
δ′(h, α) =
{
h · v if δ(last(h), α) = v
undefined if δ(last(h), α) is undefined
The natural bijection between plays of G and plays of Gunf induces a winning condition Winunf
over arenaGunf. Additionally, because of the natural bijection between strategies inG and strategies
in Gunf, Agt∃ wins (G,Win) if, and only if, Agt∃ wins (G
unf,Winunf). We say that two game
structures G and G′ are equivalent whenever their unfoldings are isomorphic1.
In this work we are interested in winning conditions expressed in the logic of knowledge and
time called LTLK (standing for linear temporal logic with knowledge), which extends LTL with
knowledge operators for each agent.
2.2 Linear-time temporal logic with knowledge
The syntax of LTLK is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | ϕUϕ | Kaϕ
where p ∈ AP and a ∈ Agt. The formulaXϕ reads as “at the next step, ϕ holds”, ϕUϕ′ reads as
“ϕ holds until ϕ′ holds”, andKaϕ is read “agent a knows that ϕ is true”.
The size |ϕ| of a formula ϕ is the number of symbols in it.
We exhibit two important syntactic fragments of LTLK: Epistemic Logic LEL obtained by re-
moving temporal operatorsX and U , i.e., generated by grammar
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kaϕ,
1 Some looser notion of bisimulation between games could also be considered but isomorphism fits here.
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and Propositional logic LProp obtained by also removing the knowledge modality.
The logic LTLK is interpreted over a moment i ∈ N along a play π ∈ PlaysG in a game arena
G = (V,Act, δ, t, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ). We write G, π, i |= ϕ, and read ‘formula ϕ holds at moment i
along play π of game arenaG’, defined inductively over ϕ as follows.
G, π, i |= p if p ∈ λ(πi)
G, π, i |= ¬ϕ if G, π, i 6|= ϕ
G, π, i |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if G, π, i |= ϕ1 or G, π, i |= ϕ2
G, π, i |= Xϕ if G, π, i + 1 |= ϕ
G, π, i |= ϕ1 Uϕ2 if ∃i′ ≥ i s.t. G, π, i′ |= ϕ2 and
∀i′′ s.t. i ≤ i′′ < i′, G, π, i′′ |= ϕ1
G, π, i |= Kaϕ if ∀π′ ∈ PlaysG s.t. π′≤i ≈a π≤i,
G, π′, i |= ϕ
An LTLK formula ϕ naturally denotes a winning condition:
Winϕ = {π ∈ Plays
G | G, π, 0 |= ϕ}.
3 DEL games
In this section we recall the definition of DEL games as recently introduced in [26]. We start with
definitions for epistemic models and DEL event models.
3.1 The classic DEL setting
In the usual possible-worlds semantics of epistemic logic, models are Kripke structures with inter-
pretations for atomic propositions [17].
◮ Definition 3. An epistemic modelM = (W, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) is a tuple where
W is a non-empty finite set of possible worlds (or situations),
≈a⊆W ×W is an indistinguishability relation for agent a, and
λ : W → 2AP is a valuation function.
We may write w ∈ M for w ∈ W . As for games with imperfect information introduced in
the previous section, we assume that indistinguishability relations≈a are equivalence relations. The
valuation function λ defines which atomic propositions hold in a world. A pair (M, w) where w ∈
M is called a pointed epistemic model, and we define |M| = |W |+
∑
a∈Agt | ≈a |+
∑
w∈W |λ(w)|,
the size ofM. We will only consider finite models, i.e. we assume thatW is finite and λ(w) is finite
for all worlds w.
◮ Definition 4. We defineM, w |= ϕ, read as ‘formula ϕ holds in the pointed epistemic model
(M, w)’, by induction on ϕ, as follows:
M, w |= p if p ∈ λ(w);
M, w |= ¬ϕ ifM, w 6|= ϕ;
M, w |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ifM, w |= ϕ1 orM, w |= ϕ2;
M, w |= Kaϕ if for all u such that w ≈a u,M, u |= ϕ.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) relies on action models (also called “event models”). These
models specify how agents perceive the occurrence of an action as well as its effects on the world.
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A
α :
pre : p
post : p← ⊥ α
′ :
pre : ⊤
post : ∅
b
a a, b
w : {p}
u : ∅
a, b
a, b
a, b
(w,α) : ∅ (w,α′) : {p}
(u, α′) : ∅
b
b
a
a, b
a, b
a, b
M M⊗A
Figure 1 Example of DEL product. Symbol ∅ indicates the trivial postcondition that leaves valuations
unchanged.
◮ Definition 5. An action model A = (A, (≈Aa )a∈Agt, pre, post) is a tuple where:
A is a non-empty finite set of possible actions,
≈Aa ⊆ A×A is the indistinguishability relation for agent a,
pre : A→ LEL the precondition function, and
post : A×AP → LProp is the postcondition function.
A pointed action model is a pair (A, α) where α represents the actual action. We let |A| be the
size ofA, whichwe define as |A| := |A|+
∑
a∈Agt | ≈
A
a |+
∑
α∈A |pre(α)|+
∑
α∈A,p∈AP |post(α, p)|.
An action α is executable in a world w of an epistemic modelM ifM, w |= pre(α), and in that
case we define λupdate(w,α) := {p ∈ AP | M, w |= post(α, p)}, the set of atomic propositions that
hold after occurrence of action α in world w.
Types of actions
An action model A is propositional if all pre- and postconditions of actions in A belong to LProp. A
public action is a pointed action model A, α such that for each agent a, ≈Aa is the identity relation.
The effect of the execution of an action in an epistemic model is captured by the update product [3]:
◮Definition 6. LetM = (W, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) be an epistemic model, andA = (A, (≈Aa )a∈Agt, pre, post)
be an action model. The product ofM andA is defined asM⊗A = (W ′, (≈a)′, λ′) where:
W ′ = {(w,α) ∈ W ×A | M, w |= pre(α)},
(w,α) ≈′a (w
′, α′) if w ≈a w
′ and α ≈Aa α
′, and
λ′((w,α)) = λupdate(w,α).
◮ Example 7. Figure 1 shows the pointed modelM, w that represents a situation in which p is
true and both agents a and b do not know it. The pointed action model A, α describes the action
where agent a learns that p was true but that it is now set to false, while agent b does not learn
anything (she sees action α′ that has trivial pre- and postcondition). In the product epistemic model
M⊗A, (w,α), agent a now knows that p is false, while b still does not know the truth value of p,
or whether agent a knows it.
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3.2 Defining DEL games
We recall the definition of DEL games as introduced in [26], but for more general winning condi-
tions.
The initial situation is described by an epistemic modelM, and the set of possible actions by an
action model A. Because the update product in DEL can only model execution of a single action at
a time, the games that we define are turn-based. We use the variable turn, ranging over the set of
agents Agt, to represent whose turn it is to play. We require that postconditions for variable turn do
not depend on the current epistemic situation, but instead the next value of turn is only determined
by the action. When the precondition pre(α) of some action α is satisfied, we may say that this
action is available. Without loss of generality, we assume that there always is at least one action
available.
The game thus starts in some world w ∈ M, and the agent a such that M, w |= turn = a
chooses some available action α which is executed. The new epistemic situation M⊗ A, (w,α)
is given by the update product, and the game goes on. After n rounds, the epistemic situation is
described by a pointed epistemic model of the formMAn, (w,α1, . . . , αn), whereMAn is defined
by lettingMA0 = M andMAn+1 = MAn⊗A. In the followingwemaywritewα1 . . . αn instead
of (w,α1, . . . , αn), and call it a history. Given that the modelMAn to which a history wα1 . . . αn
belongs is determined by the length of the history, we may omit it and write, e.g., wα1 . . . αn |= ϕ
instead ofMAn, wα1 . . . αn |= ϕ.
In order to obtain proper games of imperfect information, we will require the following hypo-
theses to hold in the epistemic and event models defining DEL games:
Hypotheses onM and A
(H1) The starting player is known: there is a player a such that for all w ∈ W , it holds that
M, w |= turn = a;
(H2) The turn stays known: for all actions α, α′ and agent a, if α ≈Aa α
′, then α and α′ assign the
same value to turn.
(H3) Players know their available actions: ifwα1 . . . αn |= turn = a andwα1 . . . αn ≈a w′α′1 . . . α
′
n,
then the same actions are available in wα1 . . . αn and in w′α′1 . . . α
′
n.
We can now define DEL games.
◮ Definition 8. A DEL game presentation (M,A, I) consists of an initial epistemic modelM and
an action model A that satisfy hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, together with a set of initial worlds I .
We now describe how a DEL game presentation (M,A, I) induces a game arenaGM,A,I as per
Definition 1.
◮ Definition 9. Given a DEL game presentation (M,A, I), we define the game arenaGM,A,I =
(V, VI , Act, δ, t, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) where, lettingMAn = (Wn, (≈na)a∈Agt, λ
n) for every n:
V =
⋃
n∈NW
n,
VI = I ,
Act is the set of actions in A,
δ(wα1 . . . αn, αn+1) =
{
wα1 . . . αnαn+1 if wα1 . . . αn |= pre(αn+1)
undefined otherwise
t(wα1 . . . αn) = a if wα1 . . . αn |= turn = a
≈a =
⋃
n∈N ≈
n
a for each agent a, and
λ(wα1 . . . αn) = λ
n(wα1 . . . αn).
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Observe that this game arena is infinite: the set of positions V is the set of histories. In the
following sections we will see that in some cases they admit finite representations that we can use to
decide the existence of winning strategies.
A DEL game GDEL = (M,A, I,Win) consists of a DEL game presentation (M,A, I) together
with a winning condition Win ⊆ PlaysGM,A,I on the induced game arenaGM,A,I . We consider the
following decision problem:
◮ Definition 10 (Distributed strategy synthesis for LTLK objectives).
Input: A DEL game GDEL = (M,A, I, ϕ) with ϕ ∈ LTLK;
Question: Does team Agt∃ win the game (GM,A,I , ϕ)?
Note that the games studied in [26] correspond to the class of DEL games where the winning
condition is given by LTLK formulas of the form Fϕ, where ϕ is purely epistemic.
◮ Remark 11. When we evaluate whether a tuple of strategies (σa)a∈Agt∃ is winning for an LTLK
formula ϕ, the semantics of the knowledge operators in ϕ does not depend on the strategies σa. In
particular, it is not restricted to indistinguishable histories that follow these strategies, but instead
it considers all indistinguishable histories in the game. This semantics models situations in which
agents do not know the strategies of agents Agt∃, and it is the one also used in [26] and in DEL
epistemic planning [10, 1, 11, 12], where the agents do not know which plan is being executed. This
semantics is called uninformed semantics in [25], contrary to the informed one. See also [34, 24] for
more discussions on the matter.
3.3 Discussion on initial positions
One subtlety that arises when formalising existence of winning strategies under imperfect inform-
ation is in defining what having a winning strategy means. For instance, are we satisfied with the
agents in Agt∃ having a distributed strategy that is winning from the initial position of the game,
even if they do not know that it is winning, in the sense that there is a world that some agent in Agt∃
considers like a possible initial position and from which the distributed strategy is not winning? Or
instead do we want everybody in the team to know that the team’s strategy is winning? These two
notions have sometimes been called objective winning and subjective winning, respectively (see [14]
and also [21] for similar considerations). We could also ask whether there is distributed knowledge
or common knowledge [17] that the distributed strategy is winning.
Note that we can model all of these notions by tuning the set of initial worlds in the definition of
a DEL game, as this defines the set of outcomes that we consider, i.e., the set of plays from which the
strategies should be winning. Assume we have an initial epistemic modelM with an initial world
wI . If we are interested in distributed strategies that are objectively winning from wI , we simply set
I = {wI} in the DEL game. If instead we want subjectively winning strategies, i.e., strategies that
not only are winning, but such that everybody in the team Agt∃ knows that they are winning, then
we let the set of initial worlds in the DEL game be
I∃ = {w ∈M | w ≈a wI for some a ∈ Agt∃}.
Objective distributed strategy synthesis was studied in [26] for reachability epistemic objectives,
i.e., when an epistemic objective is given as an epistemic formula ϕ ∈ LEL, and Win is defined
as the sets of plays π ∈ PlaysMA∗ for which there exists i ∈ N such that MA
∗, π≤i |= ϕ. Note
that such winning conditions can be specified by LTLK formulas Fϕ. It is shown that objective
distributed strategy synthesis is undecidable for propositional actions, already for a team of two
players and reachability epistemic objectives. Since the problem we study is more general, we
inherit this undecidability result.
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◮ Theorem 12. Distributed strategy synthesis for LTLK objectives is undecidable already for
propositional actions and formulas of the form Fϕ, where ϕ is purely epistemic.
In the rest of the paper we describe various cases in which decidability can be recovered.
4 DEL games with propositional actions
Extending a result from [24, 2] in the case of DEL planning, it was proved in [26] that in the case of
propositional actions, games generated by DEL game presentations are regular, and one can compute
an equivalent finite game arena:
◮ Proposition 13 ([26]). Given a DEL game presentation (M,A) where A is propositional, one
can construct a finite game arena G equivalent to GM,A,I such that |G| ≤ |M|+ |A| × 2m, where
m is the number of atomic propositions inM and A.
From the latter result, if the winning condition Win is given as a formula ϕ ∈ LTLK, then the
same winning condition on G yields a multiplayer epistemic game that is equivalent to the original
DEL game GDEL in terms of existence of distributed winning strategies. And because such games can
be decided in the case of hierarchical information, we obtain our result.
More precisely, we say that a DEL game (M,WI ,A,Win) presents hierarchical information if
the set of agents Agt∃ can be totally ordered (a1 < . . . < an) so that ≈ai⊆ ≈ai+1 and ≈
A
ai⊆ ≈
A
ai+1 ,
for each 1 ≤ i < n.
◮ Theorem 14 ([34, 25]). In multiplayer epistemic games with hierarchical information and epi-
stemic temporal objectives, distributed strategy synthesis is decidable for the uninformed semantics.
Proposition 13 together with Theorem 14 imply that:
◮ Theorem 15. Distributed strategy synthesis for LTLK objectives with propositional actions and
hierarchical information is decidable.
◮ Remark 16. The results in [34, 25] are established for games with a unique initial position, i.e.
when VI is a singleton {vI}. However it is easy to see that distributed synthesis with multiple initial
positions VI can be reduced to the case of a unique initial position: one only needs to add a fresh
position vI that is used as initial position, from which one can attain all positions in VI , and only
these. It does not matter who vI belongs to or how the agents observe it.
5 DEL games with public actions
In this section, we show that when all actions are public, the distributed strategy synthesis problem
is decidable for LTLK winning conditions. Towards this end, we first prove a result similar to Pro-
position 13: we show that given a DEL game presentation (M,A, I) where all actions α ∈ A are
public, the infinite game arena GM,A,I is regular and can be folded back into a finite game arena.
This allows us to reduce the distributed strategy synthesis problem to a distributed synthesis prob-
lem on explicit game arenas, for which a solution is known in the case of public actions and LTLK
objectives [40].
Note that the decidability result for reachability DEL games with public actions in [26] does not
rely on this kind of construction, but instead is proved by providing a direct alternating algorithm.
There is a problem in the way this algorithm forces strategies to be uniform. In the case of public
actions and unique initial world considered there it can be easily corrected, as there is in fact no need
to check for uniformity of strategies (see Remark 20). But for our more general setting with multiple
initial worlds, this approach was not sound.
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◮ Proposition 17. Given a DEL game presentation (M,A, I) where all actions in A are public,
one can compute a finite game arena G equivalent to GM,A,I such that |G| ≤ m(2p + 1)m, with p
the number of atomic propositions in (M,A) andm the number of worlds inM.
Proof. For every positionwα1 . . . αn inGM,A,I we define its attached epistemic modelMwα1...αn
as the connected component of MAn that contains wα1 . . . αn. Since all actions in A are public,
for all positionswα1 . . . αn and wα1 . . . αnαn+1 inGM,A,I we have thatMwα1...αn+1 is no bigger
thanMwα1...αn : indeed, the application of a public action can only remove worlds fromMwα1...αn
(those that do not satisfy the precondition) and change the valuations of the remaining worlds. As a
result there is only a finite number of different positions wα1 . . . αn in GM,A,I , up to isomorphism
of their attached models. We write ≡ the equivalence relation on positions of GM,A,I defined by
letting two positions be equivalent if their attached models are isomorphic, and we let [wα1 . . . αn]≡
be the equivalence class of position wα1 . . . αn for this relation.
Let us write GM,A,I = (V, VI , Act, δ, t, {≈a}a∈Agt, λ). The finite game arenaG is the quotient
of GM,A,I with ≡. More precisely,GM,A,I/≡ = (V
′, V ′I , Act
′, δ′, t′, {≈′a}a∈Agt, λ
′), where:
V ′ = {[wα1 . . . αn]≡ | wα1 . . . αn ∈ V },
V ′I = {[w]≡ | w ∈ VI},
Act′ = Act,
δ′([v]≡, α) =
{
[δ(v, α)]≡ if δ(v, α) is defined
undefined otherwise,
[v]≡ ≈′a [v
′]≡ if v ≈a v′, and
λ′([v]≡) = λ(v).
To see that δ′ is well defined, observe that if v ≡ v′ then δ(v, α) is defined if, and only if, so
is δ(v′, α), and in this case δ(v, α) ≡ δ(v′, α). The fact that ≈′a and λ
′ are well defined follows
directly from isomorphism of attached models.
To construct GM,A,I /≡, one can enumerate all possible attached models N (modulo isomorph-
ism) as follows: for each world w in the original model M, decide first whether there is some
world of the form wα1 . . . αn in N ; if there is, there is only one, because all actions are public, and
thus any position of the form wα′1 . . . α
′
n (with for some i, α
′
i 6= αi) is not related to wα1 . . . αn
and thus does not appear in N . Then, one chooses the valuation over the atomic propositions in-
volved in the problem for each world in N . Indistinguishability relations are inherited from M:
wα1 . . . αn ≈a w′α1 . . . αn if, and only if, w ≈a w′. The number of such different attached models
is bounded by
∑m
k=1
(
m
k
)
2pk = (2p + 1)m, and each one has at most m worlds. We thus have at
mostm(2p + 1)m positions in V ′. It remains to build the function δ′ as described in the definition of
GM,A,I/≡: to determine δ
′([v]≡, α), compute the product of the representant of [v]≡ in GM,A,I/≡
with (A, α), and identify the only position ofGM,A,I/≡ that is isomorphic to the result. Testing for
isomorphism can be done in exponential time, and there is an exponential number of positions to
test. Finally, the whole construction can be done in exponential time. ◭
Proposition 17 ensures that from a DEL game presentation (M,A) with public actions we can
construct an equivalent finite game arena of exponential size. Moreover, in this game arena, all
actions are public in the sense of [6]. In this latter work, model checking ATL∗ with epistemic
operators (ATL∗K) on game arenas with public actions is proved in 2EXPTIME. More precisely, the
proposed procedure takes time doubly exponential in the size of the formula, but only exponential
time in the size of the game structure. Combinedwith our exponential construction from Theorem17,
we obtain a procedure to solve our distributed strategy synthesis problem for public actions in doubly
exponential time, both in the size of the DEL game presentation and in the size the LTLK winning
condition ϕ.
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To make our argument more precise, we briefly recall the syntax and semantics of ATL∗K. The
syntax of ATL∗K is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kaϕ | 〈A〉ψ
ψ ::= ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | Xψ | ψ Uψ
where p ∈ AP and a ∈ Agt. Formulas of type ϕ are called history formulas, while those of type
ψ are called path formulas. Note that, in addition, the authors of [6] consider epistemic operators
for common and distributed knowledge. We omit them from the syntax as we do not consider such
operators in this work.
The semantics of ATL∗K is defined in [6] on concurrent-game structures. We instead define it on
our turn-based game structures, which can be seen as a particular case. Let us first recall the notion
of public actions for game arenas considered in [6]:
◮ Definition 18. A game arenaG = (V, VI , Act, δ, t, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ) has only public actions if, for
all v, v′ ∈ V and α, α′ ∈ Act such that α 6= α′, we have δ(v, α) 6≈a δ(v′, α′).
The semantics ofATL∗K formulas is defined with respect to a game arenaG together with a history
h in case of a history formula, or a play π and a point in time i ∈ N in case of a path formula.
G, h |= p if p ∈ λ(h)
G, h |= ¬ϕ if G, π, i 6|= ϕ
G, h |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if G, π, i |= ϕ1 or G, π, i |= ϕ2
G, h |= Kaϕ if ∀h′ ∈ Hist
G s.t. h′ ≈a h, G, h′ |= ϕ
G, h |= 〈A〉ψ if there exists σA s.t. ∀π ∈ Out(h, σA),
G, π, |h| − 1 |= ψ
G, π, i |= ϕ if G, π≤i |= ϕ
G, π, i |= ¬ϕ if G, π, i 6|= ϕ
G, π, i |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if G, π, i |= ϕ1 or G, π, i |= ϕ2
G, π, i |= Xϕ if G, π, i + 1 |= ϕ
G, π, i |= ϕ1 Uϕ2 if ∃i′ ≥ i s.t. G, π, i′ |= ϕ2 and
∀i′′ s.t. i ≤ i′′ < i′, G, π, i′′ |= ϕ1
In the above definition, Out(h, σA) is the set of plays that extend h by following σA, which
corresponds to the objective semantics discussed in Section 3.3. Thus, it is easy to see that for an
LTLK formula ψ and a game arenaG with a singleton set of initial positions VI = {vI}, it holds that
Agt∃ wins (G,ϕ) if, and only if, G, vI |= 〈Agt∃〉ψ (technically, ψ should be modified by replacing
each occurrence of knowledge modalityKa byKa〈∅〉 in order to have a history formula).
As explained in [6], their procedure can be adapted to the subjective semantics, i.e. when the
distributed strategy σA is required to be winning from all positions that are equivalent to vI for some
agent in Agt∃. It is not hard to see that this adaptation would also work for any set VI of initial
positions, and that it does not change the complexity of the procedure.
◮ Theorem 19. For public actions, distributed strategy synthesis for LTLK objectives is 2EXPTIME-
complete.
Proof. Let (M,A, I, ϕ) be a DEL game with ϕ ∈ LTLK and such that all actions are public. By
Proposition 17 we can compute in exponential time a finite game arena G = GM,A,I/≡ equivalent
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to GM,A,I with |G| ≤ m(2p + 1)m, wherem is the number of worlds inM and p is the number of
atomic propositions in (M,A).
We show that this finite game arenaG has only public actions in the sense of Definition 18. Write
G = (V,Act, δ, t, {≈a}a∈Agt, λ), and recall that V = {[wα1 . . . αn]≡ | wα1 . . . αn ∈ GM,A,I}.
Take two positions v = [wα1 . . . αi]≡ and v′ = [w′α′1 . . . α
′
j ]≡ in V , and α, α
′ ∈ Act such that
α 6= α′. By definition, δ(v, α) = [wα1 . . . αiα]≡ and δ(v′, α′) = [w′α′1 . . . α
′
jα
′]≡. Since α and
α′ are public actions and α 6= α′, necessarily wα1 . . . αiα 6≈a w′α′1 . . . α
′
jα
′, entailing δ(v, α) 6≈a
δ(v′, α′).
We can thus use the model-checking procedure from [6] to evaluate whetherG satisfies 〈Agt∃〉ϕ.
This procedure takes time doubly exponential in the size of ϕ and exponential in the size ofG, which
is itself exponential in the size of the DEL game presentation (M,A), hence the upper bound. The
lower bound is obtained by reduction from LTL synthesis, which is 2EXPTIME-complete [33]. ◭
◮ Remark 20. We point out that in the context of public actions, the case of a unique initial
position is in fact equivalent to the perfect-information simplification of the problem, in which the
uniformity requirement for strategies is dropped. Indeed in this case the uniformity constraint is
trivial to satisfy: assume there is a winning distributed strategy (σa)a∈Agt where the strategies are
not necessarily uniform. Take two histories h and h′ that are equivalent to some agent a ∈ Agt∃. If
one of them, say h′, does not start inwI , then it does not matter how strategies (σa)a∈Agt are defined
on h′, because they are not required to be winning from worlds other than wI ; one can thus change
the definition of the strategies on h′ to make them uniform. Otherwise, if both start in wI , because
actions are public, h = h′ so that the strategies are already uniform on these histories.
6 DEL games with public announcements
We now investigate DEL games with public announcements, which are public actions with no effect
besides epistemic ones. We assume that the winning conditions are restricted to LTL(U)K0, the
syntactic fragment of LTLK objectives with no next modality (X) and with no temporal operator (X
or U ) under the scope of a knowledge modality (Ka). We also assume that the games are round-
robin, i.e. the turn goes from an agent to the next in a circular order, and we assume a unique initial
world. We show that, in this context, deciding the existence of a winning strategy for the team
Agt∃ in a DEL game G
DEL = (M,A, I, ϕ) and ϕ ∈ LTL(U)K0 is PSPACE-complete. Because
reachability goals are definable in LTL(U)K0, this result generalises the PSPACE-completeness
result established in [26].
Formally, a public announcement is a public action (A, α) such that post(α, p) = p, for each
variable p but variable turn. This is the natural generalisation of public announcements as defined
in [31, 41]. As a consequence on the product update, either an announcement is non-informative
and the updated epistemic model remains the same (modulo variable turn), or it is informative and
yields an epistemic model with strictly less worlds.
◮ Theorem 21. In round-robin DEL games with unique initial world and public announcements,
distributed strategy synthesis for LTL(U)K0 winning conditions is PSPACE-complete.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 21. The problem is already
PSPACE-hard for reachability goals [26], therefore it is still PSPACE-hard for LTL(U)K0 object-
ives. Regarding the membership in PSPACE, the two main ideas are:
1. From an initial epistemic model M = (W, (≈a)a∈Agt, λ), there are at most |W | informative
announcements;
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2. To limit the length of plays, we can shorten, as depicted in Figure 2, sequences of non-informative
announcements: from a strategy σ we show how to extract an eager strategy σeager that performs
all informative announcements eventually recommended by σ as early as possible. Thus, any
sequence of non-informative announcements followed by an informative one is of length at most
the number |Agt| of agents: if an agent wants to perform an informative event in the future, she
can do so as soon as it is her turn to play. This, in a round-robin game, happens in at most |Agt|
steps.
As a result of these two points, we can search for eager strategies via a depth-first search in GM,A,I
up to depth |Agt| × |M|.
We now describe how to extract eager strategies. In the following we call states the attached
epistemic models2 in GM,A,I , writing them s, s1, . . . . These are mere submodels of the initial
model M, if we ignore variable turn. We then write sk for the sequence with k consecutive s’s
(only variable turn is changing).
Given a distributed strategy σ = (σa)a∈Agt∃ , we let the eager distributed strategy σ
eager =
(σeagera )a∈Agt∃ be defined by σ
eager
a (h) := σa(looka(h)) where looka(h) is a history called look
ahead. This looka(h) is, when it exists, a history that follows σ, in which it is a’s turn to play
and σa(looka(h)) is informative. Also, h is a stuttering-equivalent subsequence of looka(h) where
agents bypass non-informative announcements and perform informative ones prescribed by σ as
soon as possible. There might be no such looka(h) if agents are not eager in h. We define looka(h)
by induction:
looka(ǫ) := ǫ (base case);
if h = h′s where h′ is a history and s is a state with either h′ = ǫ or |s| < |last(h′)| (an
informative announcement has been made), looka((h′sk)) = looka(h′)sℓ, such that looka(h′)sℓ
follows σ and ℓ is
i. if it exists, the smallest integer such that turn(looka(h′)sℓ) = a, and σ(looka(h′)sℓ) is
informative at looka(h′)sℓ.
ii. otherwise take ℓ = k.
◮ Lemma 22. Any outcome of σeager is of the form sk11 . . . s
kn
n s
ω where |s1| < |s2| < · · · < |sn|
and ki < |Agt|.
As informative announcements prescribed by (σeagera )a∈Agt∃ coincide with the ones prescribed
by (σa)a∈Agt∃ , the outcomes of σ
eager are stuttering equivalent to some outcome of σ. Recall that
two paths are stuttering equivalent if omitting repetitions of states in both of them yields the same
sequence of states. For instance, s1s2s2s3 and s1s1s2s3s3 are stuttering equivalent (see [23]).
◮ Lemma 23. For any outcome of σeager, there exists a stuttering equivalent outcome of σ.
We now design a polynomial space algorithm that decides whether there exists such an eager
strategy σeagera by performing a depth-first-search (minmax-like approach) in the unfolding ofGM,A,I
at polynomial depth |Agt| × |M|.
Every time a leaf s is reached, it is considered as the attached epistemic model in which the game
stays forever with no more informative announcement (i.e. sω). We then evaluate the winning condi-
tion LTL(U)K0-formula by model checking the path carried by the branch in this tree. Now, model
checking a path against LTL(U)K0 is a problem in P: because we require that no temporal operator
occur under the scope of knowledge modalities, epistemic subformulas occurring in the challenged
2 see proof of Proposition 17, page 10.
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w : {p}
u : ∅
b
a, b
a, b
turn a
w : {p}
u : ∅
b
a, b
a, b
turn b
w : {p}
u : ∅
b
a, b
a, b
turn a
w : {p} a, b
turn b
announce⊤ announce⊤ announce p
announce pFigure 2 Strategy σeager bypasses the non-informative announcements in σ and makes the same informative
announcement (here p) but eagerly.
LTL(U)K0-formula can be evaluated locally on the path so that these subformulas become mere
propositions. It remains to model check an LTL-formula on this marked path which can be done in
polynomial time (see for example [15, Section 6.4.3]).
Notice that while running this depth-first-search, one needs to remember the current branch
(needed for backtracking in the minmax algorithm) as well as the information used by the LTL(U)K0
path model-checking procedure, which yields a poly-size information, so that the algorithm runs in
polynomial space.
We now prove that this algorithm is correct. If the algorithm accepts the input, then we have
some winning strategy in hands, namely some σeager, and we are done.
Conversely, assume there exists a winning strategy σ. Because any LTL(U)-formula (no X
operator) is stuttering-invariant (see for example [15, Th. 6.6.5 p. 184]), and because in our logic
LTL(U)K0, epistemic subformulas are evaluated locally in states, just as propositions, the outcomes
of σeager do also satisfy the winning conditions by Lemma 23. Now because of Lemma 22 strategy
σeager will be found by the algorithm, which concludes.
7 Conclusion
We generalised the setting defined in [26] for distributed synthesis in DEL games, moving from
reachability winning conditions to ones expressed in LTLK, and allowing for multiple initial posi-
tions, which allows us to capture various semantics of strategic ability but also makes the problem
harder in the case of public actions.
We showed that the main results established in [26] can be lifted to this more general setting: of
course the problem remains undecidable, but decidability is retrieved in the case of public actions,
as well as propositional actions together with hierarchical information.
In the latter case the problem is, as usual, nonelementary, as each agent in the team with a
different observation of the game adds an exponential to the cost of solving it [32, 27]. But for
public actions we proved that the problem is in 2EXPTIME, which is optimal as this is already the
complexity of solving LTL synthesis [33]. A central technical result was to establish the regularity
of infinite DEL game arenas generated from public actions. We conjecture that our techniques
could extend to even more expressive winning conditions, such as ones expressible in epistemic
mu-calculus.
Regarding public announcements, we showed that the distributed synthesis problem is PSPACE-
complete for winning conditions in the fragment LTL(U)K0, when games are round-robin and have
a unique initial world. The complexity of generalisations such as several initial positions or winning
conditions beyond LTL(U)K0 is still open.
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